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Conceptualizations of Knowledge in
Structuring Approaches to Moral
Development: A Process-Relational
Approach
Jeremy I. M. Carpendale* , Vicki L. Parnell and Beau Wallbridge
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada
Like other aspects of child development, views of the nature and development
of morality depend on philosophical assumptions or worldviews presupposed by
researchers. We analyze assumptions regarding knowledge linked to two contrasting
worldviews: Cartesian-split-mechanistic and process-relational. We examine the
implications of these worldviews for approaches to moral development, including
relations between morality and social outcomes, and the concepts of information,
meaning, interaction and computation. It is crucial to understand how researchers
view these interrelated concepts in order to understand approaches to moral
development. Within the Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview, knowledge is viewed as
representation and meaning is mechanistic and fixed. Both nativism and empiricism are
based in this worldview, differing in whether the source of representations is assumed to
be primarily internal or external. Morality is assumed to pre-exist, either in the genome
or the culture. We discuss problems with these conceptions and endorse the process-
relational paradigm, according to which knowledge is constructed through interaction,
and morality begins in activity as a process of coordinating perspectives, rather than the
application of fixed rules. The contrast is between beginning with the mind or beginning
with social activity in explaining the mind.
Keywords: moral development, worldviews, knowledge, nativism, empiricism, constructivism, process-relational
INTRODUCTION
Morality permeates our lives. It is embedded in our way of life, in ways that range from how we
treat each other in everyday interaction, to broader social and political levels concerning injustice
and inequality. The social fabric of our cultural worlds is woven around how we treat each other,
and concern for others and their dignity is embedded in the pragmatic structures of human
communication. Morality extends to larger scale social structures and decisions that affect others’
lives and involves concern for others’ welfare and well-being and obligations concerning what is
right and wrong (Dahl and Killen, 2018). We face decisions that affect others at many levels, and we
now have increasing awareness of how our actions affect others around the world through climate
change. Thus, morality is a central aspect of being human and living with others.
The importance of morality in human life raises the question of how children become moral.
Accounting for this aspect of child development depends on understanding the philosophical
assumptions regarding knowledge and meaning which are the starting points for developmental
research (Jopling, 1993). If we want to understand how children come to think about the
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world, including moral aspects of experience, we cannot ignore
how they come to know the world, and this requires an
epistemological analysis concerning views about the nature
and development of knowledge (Chapman, 1999). We analyze
conceptions of knowledge assumed by researchers that are linked
to two worldviews: Cartesian-split-mechanistic and process-
relational (Overton, 2015). We explore how the related concepts
of information, meaning, and interaction are conceptualized
differently from the perspectives of these two worldviews, and
play a role in the ways that morality is understood.
Two contrasting approaches to morality that tend to be
taken for granted are the nativist view that moral norms
are primarily explained as pre-existing in humans’ biological
nature, versus the empiricist view that moral norms pre-
exist in the social world and are imposed on children from
previous generations. These are generally the only options
considered, so that if researchers argue against nativism
it is assumed that they are arguing for empiricism. Most
researchers, whether they emphasize nativism or empiricism,
acknowledge that morality is some synthesis of biological
and cultural (e.g., Bloom, 2010; Mikhail, 2020). Clearly it
is necessary to include biological and evolutionary factors
as well as social and cultural dimensions in understanding
moral development, but it is possible to explicate the role of
biology either from a gene centered approach, as in nativism,
or an alternative, developmental systems approach (Griffiths
and Tabery, 2013) that we outline, consistent with a process-
relational perspective.
We argue that it is not just a matter of knowing
where to draw the line in a “middle ground” between
nativism and empiricism. This does not solve the problem
because nature and nurture are still taken as pre-existing;
information is assumed to pre-exist, either in the genes or
in the environment. Both approaches are problematic, in
that rather than explaining moral norms they explain them
away by reducing them to either biological determinism or
conformity to culturally imposed rules. In both views the
passive individual is caused to act so there is no moral agent
making choices to act morally, and thus neither approach
cannot explain the development of a sense of moral obligation
(Carpendale et al., 2010).
Morality is a complex aspect of human life that can be
discussed in terms of cognition, emotions, and action. Various
theorists focus on different aspects of this interrelated system
and conceptualize the processes differently. For instance, in
reacting to Kohlberg’s emphasis on reasoning others have more
recently swung to focus on emotions. However, their role in
morality is conceptualized in radically different ways. One claim
is that moral decisions are due to evolved emotional responses
(Haidt, 2001). We recognize the important role of emotions,
but we consider their role in structuring the relationships
in which morality develops. From the developmental systems
perspective we propose, although these aspects of morality can be
abstracted, they are interrelated and bidirectionally interwoven
over development. Morality concerns the coordination of actions
with others, and cognition, emotions, and action are aspects of
the interaction with others in which children develop morality.
From our perspective on understanding the links between
morality and social consequences, morality emerges within lives
lived with others, and thus, within social consequences. From
the action-based perspective we endorse, morality emerges from
social and emotional interaction, so social consequences underlie
the development of morality. Once morality begins to emerge as a
way of understanding and thinking about interaction with others,
it then plays a role in individuals’ choices about actions. Skills in
understanding and making moral choices can influence future
moral action in a complex bidirectional manner that plays out
over developmental time.
In contrast to the approaches we criticize, we suggest that
explaining the development of moral thinking and action should
begin with interpersonal relations from the perspective of a
process-relational worldview. We trace the implications for
minds and morality of the view that “We are what we are
through our relations with others” (Mead, 1934, p. 379). We
propose that moral norms emerge in intersubjective experience
through cooperative interaction among equals. We outline
a process-relational approach to explaining the emergence
of moral norms, beginning in infancy within the human
social and emotional developmental system and extending
through childhood. Interpersonal agreement is made possible
in relationships based on mutual affection and mutual respect.
Within such cooperative relationships among equals, practical
morality emerges before children are able to articulate and
then think about moral conflicts. In this way morality has its
developmental roots in interactivity, and as children master a
language they can then use it to reflect on moral issues and make
decisions. Thus, morality is understood as beginning in social
and emotional activity before children are able to think about
and reflect on moral issues. What emerges is not a set of moral
rules but rather a method or process for reaching moral decisions
(Piaget, 1932/1965; Mead, 1934; Carpendale et al., 2013)1.
We first outline and critique current nativist explanations of
moral development, focusing primarily on Moral Foundations
Theory (Graham et al., 2013). We then explore how the nativist-
empiricist debate is embedded in the Cartesian-split-mechanistic
worldview, and instead we suggest a developmental systems
perspective. Then we consider how conceptions of meaning
and knowledge are influenced by worldviews. Finally, as an
1Describing and explaining the emergence of more complex forms of organization
is central to developmental psychology. However, the possibility of emergence is
highly controversial in philosophy (O’Connor, 2020). One barrier to the possibility
of emergence is the assumption that all definition permits back-translation.
Bickhard (2009) claims, however, that this is false because implicit definition does
not. A second barrier to the possibility of emergence is Jaegwon Kim’s argument
that emergence is not possible because if only particles possess causal power, then
the organization of particles cannot possess causal power beyond the particles
themselves. According to contemporary physics, however, rather than particles,
the fundamental constituents of the world are dynamic quantum fields, which
are processes. Bickhard (2009) argues that in contrast to a substance/particle
metaphysics, within a process metaphysics organization can have causal power and
thus emergence is possible. Many sciences are moving toward a process perspective
(Griffiths and Stotz, 2000; Bickhard, 2009), and that is what we are suggesting. We
suggest that morality does not exist at the level of the individual, it emerges from
the coordination of conflicting perspectives, which is possible within cooperative
relationships based on mutual affection and respect. Thus, what emerges is a
pattern of organization that exists at the level of the coordination of the views of
the people involved (Boom, 2004; Bickhard, 2008, 2009, 2011).
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alternative, we outline an approach to moral development from
the perspective of the process-relational worldview2.
BIOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT IN
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF
INTERACTION AND INFORMATION
There are many recent claims that some aspects of morality
are innate (e.g., Hauser, 2006a,b; Hamlin et al., 2007; Mikhail,
2007, 2020; Bloom, 2010, 2012; Hamlin, 2013; Margolis and
Laurence, 2013; Warneken, 2016). Bloom (2010, p. 46), for
example, claimed that humans, “have a rudimentary moral sense
from the very start of life.. . . Some sense of good and evil seems
to be bred in the bone.” There is ongoing debate regarding
this claim (e.g., Prinz, 2009; Sterelny, 2010), and elsewhere we
have criticized nativist approaches making claims that infants
are born with innate principles of fairness (Carpendale et al.,
2021), an innate moral core (Carpendale et al., 2013), and innate
altruism (Carpendale et al., 2015; Carpendale and Lewis, 2021).
Here we focus our critical attention primarily on one highly cited
approach and we check the foundations of Moral Foundation
Theory (Graham et al., 2013).
According to Moral Foundations Theory, “genes (collectively)
write the first draft into neural tissue, beginning in utero but
continuing throughout childhood. Experience (cultural learning)
revises the draft during childhood, and even (to a lesser extent)
during adulthood”(Graham et al., 2013, p. 61). In stating their
claim that morality is innate, Graham et al. (2013, p. 100)
assert that, “the discussion should focus on how exactly moral
knowledge is innate, not whether it is.” However, despite this
strong claim, they and others do not discuss “how exactly moral
knowledge is innate” (Dahl et al., 2021). In phrasing the problem
in terms of how moral knowledge is innate, it seems that what
is being proposed is an account of how knowledge could be
innate, referring to the biological processes involved in getting
from genes to justice and from neurons to norms. We suggest
that an attempt to explicate how this is claimed to occur would
make it clear that a direct route is in fact not consistent with
current biology.
With its reference to the role of genes, nativism could
mistakenly be taken for a biological approach, and to criticize
nativism is thus to criticize the role of biological factors and
instead argue for social factors. That is, it could be assumed that
the only alternative to nativism’s claim that knowledge pre-exists
in biology is empiricism and social factors. But this buys into
the very dichotomy we reject. In discussing flaws in nativism we
are not arguing for empiricism. In fact, nativism and empiricism
2We lack the space to critically examine all of the aspects of nativism that we see as
problematic, nor can we examine all of the versions of nativism and their roots in
the history of ideas (see Allen and Bickhard, 2013). But it is important to explicate
some of the underlying assumptions of nativism and empiricism in an attempt to
avoid the assimilation of our approach to the Procrustean bed of this worldview
which contains only these two options. If we criticize nativism it might be assumed
that we therefore must be endorsing empiricism. Instead, in taking an action-based
approach we step off the pendulum between the two options and work from the
perspective of a different worldview (Allen and Bickhard, 2013).
share many of the same problematic foundations of knowledge as
pre-existing, either in the individual or in the society.
In fact, nativism does not amount to taking biology seriously,
and does not actually rest on biological knowledge. Although
Graham et al. (2013) claim that genes write into neural tissue, they
fail to provide a reference to the biological literature regarding
this claimed process3. Nativists seem to have a tendency to neglect
citing biological research; this is consistent with the tradition
following from Chomsky (2007), who was so compelled by his
logical arguments that evidence from psychology or biology
was not considered relevant. In fact, a number of biologists
and geneticists have attempted to provide psychologists with
some rudimentary idea of how genes work in the hope that
they might improve understanding of the role of genes and
environment in development (e.g., Fisher, 2006; Meaney, 2010),
as well as how neural pathways are formed through experience
(e.g., Mareschal et al., 2007; Stiles, 2009; Stiles et al., 2015). Genes
do not write into neural tissue in the sense of forming neural
connectivity. There is a long “tortuous” process through which
genes are involved in a system resulting in human development
(e.g., Fisher, 2006).
Genes are fairly inert molecules involved in the production
of chains of amino acids as a step in the production of proteins,
but the chains still need to be folded up within the cell. Although
genes are crucial in development, it is problematic to assume that
information exists at the level of genes or a “genetic program”
because how genes function depends on many other factors in
the environment, beginning at the level of the cell and extending
to social interaction. The effect of a gene can vary as widely
as promoting cell life or leading to cell death, depending on
what co-factors exist in the cytoplasm (Meaney, 2010). Thus, the
foundations of MFT appear to be based on implausible biological
assumptions. Furthermore, the incredible complexity of neural
interconnectivity that makes human lives possible is gradually
shaped through experience (e.g., Stiles, 2009; Stiles et al., 2015).
Although clearly it is necessary to include biological and
evolutionary factors as well as social and cultural factors
in understanding moral development, the process-relational
approach we propose is fundamentally different from a mixture
of nativism and empiricism. The approach we endorse does
of course consider the human developmental system consisting
of evolved biological characteristics of infants and parents, set
within cultural contexts. However, there are two fundamentally
different ways in which this interaction can be conceptualized:
either through a gene-centered approach according to which
3Graham et al. (2013) might respond that they were just using a metaphor, but
they still need some actual biological process for getting from genes to neural
interconnectivity that they claim is “organized in advance of experience” (p. 61,
emphasis is original). They might respond that this is a problem for biologists not
for them. However, the problem they give to biologists should at least be consistent
with what is currently known about genetics and neural development (e.g., Stiles,
2009; Meaney, 2010; Stiles et al., 2015). Even if genes could “write . . . into neural
tissue” by specifying neural interconnectivity it is not clear how many genes
would be required to pre-specify the trillions of synaptic connections in human
brains, and many species have more genes than humans. Infants are born with
exuberant connectivity that is “pruned” away after birth in an ongoing dynamic
and interactive process of brain development that does not seem consistent with
Graham et al’s. (2013) claims (Mareschal et al., 2007; Stiles et al., 2015).
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these are considered separate, pre-existing factors that then
interact, or from a developmental systems perspective that does
without the dichotomy (e.g., Gottlieb, 2007; Griffiths and Tabery,
2013). We have discussed flaws with the gene-centered approach
that assumes genes carry information in a genetic program;
instead, we suggest that genes are one crucial factor in a system of
bidirectionally interacting factors. Thus, in contrast to nativism,
process-relational approaches take biology seriously through its
role in human developmental systems. Rather than thinking of
biology and environment as separable factors that interact, if we
look closely at development, we see a system from which these
interwoven factors are abstracted. Biology cannot be separated
from environments because organisms create and elicit their
environments through their characteristics, and, in turn, biology
is structured by experience. This process begins with infants’
action tendencies and sensory abilities in early development,
which elicit the environment in which they develop in a bi-
directional manner.
Regularity in developmental outcomes could be assumed to
be evidence for nativists’ claims of knowledge pre-existing at the
genetic level. However, such regularity does not mean that it must
be due to something pre-existing, such as genes. To illustrate
this point, consider the example of mature forests in particular
climate zones. The type of forest tends to be a consistent and
regular outcome over many decades. This is the result of the
interaction of multiple factors, including the characteristics of
the species involved such as their tolerance for shade and so
on. For example, a mature forest in the Pacific northwest tends
to be Western Red Cedar and Douglas Fir, even though the
information for that outcome does not pre-exist anywhere.
Instead, it is the natural outcome of ecological succession within
particular conditions (Griffiths and Stotz, 2000).
Rather than assuming pre-existing information encoded in
genes, we argue that regularities in the development of moral
knowledge can emerge through typical human developmental
systems. We now turn from criticizing claims about getting from
genes to the first draft of moral cognition, to analyzing the nature
of this cognition.
CONCEPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE AND
MEANING IN CONTRASTING
WORLDVIEWS
The moral nativists we are focusing on assume the
computational/representational framework. According to
this computational theory of mind, thinking—in this case,
about morality—is based on computation involving mental
representations that are linked to the world (e.g., Graham et al.,
2013; Mikhail, 2020). Moral Foundations Theory
“proposes that the human mind is organized in advance of
experience so that it is prepared to learn values, norms, and
behaviors related to a diverse set of recurrent adaptive social
problems. . .. We think of this innate organization as being
implemented by sets of related modules which work together to
guide and constrain responses to each particular problem” (Graham
et al., 2013, p. 63).
For example, it is assumed that infants are born with innate
principles such as a principle of fairness in the “first draft” of
moral cognition (e.g., Bian et al., 2018; Buyukozer Dawkins et al.,
2019). From this perspective, thinking is computation based on
mental representations that are meaningful because they are
linked to the world.
An issue with this view, however, is the problem of how such
representations are linked to the world in a way that makes
them meaningful. As Wittgenstein (1953/2009) has argued,
representations cannot carry their own meaning because any
representation could be interpreted in multiple ways (e.g., Heil,
1981; Goldberg, 1991). Thus, the only way to bring meaning into
the computational/representational framework is to implicitly
assume a homunculus (Heil, 1981; Kenny, 1991). That is, what
is required is something in the system like a small person that
attributes meaning to the representation, just as a person must
attribute meaning to the input and output of a computer. This, of
course, is problematic because it just puts off rather than provides
an explanation (for further criticism of the computational theory
of mind see e.g., Heil, 1981; Carpendale et al., 2021; Carpendale
and Lewis, 2021).
As Hobson (2002, p. 14) noted, “computers don’t understand
anything, nor do they care.” To further spell out Hobson’s
point, computers don’t understand because they don’t care.
A computational system is not linked to the world in ways
that can involve significance and meaning. Morality, however, is
necessarily based on the emotional significance of social actions
and outcomes for the people involved. It involves coordinating
conflicting goals.
A mechanical process is not based on meaning, so it is not
possible to get from computation to caring. To claim that a
computer program can contain principles of fairness is like
assuming that an automatic door opener is polite. The door works
through a passive mechanical process. If it fails to open it is not
rude, just broken. In contrast, persons open doors for others
because they are recognized as persons with goals and all that
entails. Similarly, although it is possible to design a mechanism
to divide resources equally, this does not mean that the machine
is moral and is applying a principle of fairness. If it fails to
operate properly it is not immoral, just defective. If morality is
reduced to the mechanical computation that genes write into
neural tissue, then it is causal not normative, and within such an
approach the normative dimension of morality is not explained;
rather, it is explained away. Additionally, this sort of an approach
risks self-contradiction if theorists claim to be involved in the
normative enterprise of science yet there is no place for reasons in
their theory (Habermas, 1983/1990; Carpendale et al., 2010). This
would be like “sawing off the branch on which one sits” (Bennett
and Hacker, 2003, pp. 376–377). We have analyzed the influence
of how information is conceptualized in the context of genes
encoding information, and how meaning is conceptualized as
fixed in the context of the computational view of the mind. Both
conceptualizations of information and meaning in this Cartesian-
split-mechanistic worldview are derived from the theory of
knowledge as representation. Both nativism and empiricism,
although apparently different approaches, actually begin from
the same Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview (Overton, 2015),
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and the theory of knowledge as pre-existing representation that
is located either primarily in the child and explained through
biology or in the social world and imposed on the child.
This conception of knowledge is what Piaget (1970) referred to
as a copy theory and Dewey (1960) labeled the spectator notion of
knowledge. Both descriptions bring out the point that knowledge
is viewed as solely based on perception (Piaget, 1970/1972).
According to this perspective, developing knowledge is viewed
as forming a copy of the world. But because it is assumed that
we have no direct access to the world, the only way to check
our representation is by forming another copy (Wittgenstein,
1953/2009). Thus, we cannot tell if our representation of the
world that is meant to reflect our knowledge of the world is
accurate because we cannot directly compare it to the world. If
we cannot become aware of errors then we cannot learn, and
an approach that cannot account for learning is fundamentally
flawed (Bickhard, 2009). Although such an approach is meant
to explain knowledge, in fact, it already presupposes knowledge
(e.g., Dewey, 1960; Piaget, 1970; Chapman, 1999; Carpendale and
Lewis, 2004, 2006, 2021; Bibok et al., 2008; Bickhard, 2009).
We have argued that the worldview on which nativism and
empiricism are based is problematic, and is based on a flawed
view of knowledge as representation, which results in flawed
conceptualizations of information and meaning. An alternative
approach to knowledge, consistent with the process-relational
worldview, is an emergent constructivism according to which
knowledge develops through learning the interactive potential
of the world. This world includes other people, which adds a
normative dimension to this process. An infant is an agent with
needs and emotions who learns how the world responds to her
actions in positive or negative ways. Thus, meaning emerges
along with anticipations as the child learns about the world and
what she can do with it (Piaget, 1936/1952), and perception is
seeing the world in terms of the potential for interaction (e.g.,
Chapman, 1999). An understanding of fairness is based on the
meaning actions have in terms of the emotional consequences for
the people involved, and others’ reactions must be valued. We




Moral norms concern what is right and wrong. They are not
a part of the physical world, so how do they arise (Brandom,
1994)? We don’t observe an understanding of commitment,
obligation, and right and wrong in other species. What, then,
is the source of moral norms? Children grow up in cultures
with moral norms that are imposed on them. They may
come to understand and accept these moral rules, or perhaps
challenge and possibly change such norms. To account for
this and explain how it is that rather than passively accept
rules children may challenge and attempt to change cultural
norms, we argue that moral norms and right and wrong emerge
at the level of action and interaction. Assumptions about the
source of moral norms are linked to assumptions about their
nature. That is, if they are causal through being determined
by biology, or external and imposed from the outside, then it
could be questioned whether they are actually morality because
the individual is being compelled to act (Wright, 1982a,b).
Thus, this way of thinking seems to define moral norms out
of existence (Carpendale et al., 2010). Although neurons are
necessary for morality, they do not cause norms and explain
moral development. Just as we do not get an answer for why
two plus two is four at the level of neural activity (Piaget, 1971,
p. 49), morality does not arise at the level of the individual and
biological activity.
The process-relational approach we propose begins from
activity, and thus fits with Piaget’s (1932/1965) still overlooked
view that children first work out a way of interacting with
each other in their practical activity through coordinating their
actions with others. Piaget began from practical interaction,
within a particular form of relationship that is based on mutual
affection and mutual respect. In these relationships, children
enjoy the interaction and want to continue it and thus have
to work out a way of getting along with each other and
coordinating their sometimes conflicting goals. This is a form of
interaction that is best suited to reaching mutual understanding
because equals feel an obligation to listen to each other as
well as explain their own position (Piaget, 1932/1965). There
is already a form of morality in the “constitutive rules” that
structure such relationships because the individuals involved
treat each other as persons and listen to others as well as
explain their own perspective. Thus, “morality is the logic of
action” (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 398). Within such interaction
it is possible to formulate “constituted rules” concerning how
to coordinate their action (Piaget, 1932/1965; Carpendale,
2009).
This outcome is a coordination of everyone’s interests, and
it must be based on caring about each other as a foundation
in structuring the interaction. Caring is not something that is
added later or reached through reasoning. Instead, concern for
others and not just taking everything for oneself is part of the
foundation of the human developmental system. This involves
treating others as persons—someone, not something (Spaemann,
2006). This interaction is based on care, affection, and enjoyment
of interaction. Language is used in order to explain oneself and
listen to others in coordinating conflicting goals.
Once a form of morality has emerged at the practical, lived
level, Piaget (1932/1965) then suggested that a gradual process of
“conscious realization” occurs, through which children became
able to verbally articulate the ways of interacting that are already
present in their activity. Here language plays an important role,
first, in the process of reaching mutual understanding within
interaction among equals and achieving a solution to conflicts
that is agreeable to all. Second, language again plays a role in
the process of articulating and reflecting on that earlier achieved
competence in the way children treat each other. From this
perspective morality does not begin in the structure of the
mind. Instead, it begins in social activity and emerges in the
coordination of action through experiencing the consequences of
one’s actions. The mind is structured through activity and cannot
be structured prior to experience.
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From this perspective, morality is a process. There is nothing
“objective” about this in a foundational or fixed sense of certainty
outside of human interaction. Morality is also not “subjective” in
the sense of just being based on personal whims. Instead, it is
intersubjective in the sense of arising through coordination with
others. It is the logic of interaction that arises in the coordination
of action with others (Piaget, 1932/1965). And in this sense, it
is an aspect of communication and cooperation through being
based on valuing all other viewpoints as equal. This begins by
being rooted in relations based in mutual affection and caring for
each other. Children first work out a practical morality as a way of
coordinating their action with others because it is more enjoyable
to play that way. Adults can play a role in facilitating relationships
that are best suited to reaching understanding. But this is different
from adults imposing rules that children don’t understand.
Similar ideas are present in the work of other theorists. The
idea of coordinating conflicting perspectives was also present in
Mead’s (1934, p. 389) argument for a moral process that involves
considering all perspectives involved—“the method of morality.”
Mead (1934, p. 379) derived the universality of moral judgment
from our social nature, “from the fact that we take the attitude of
the entire community, of all rational beings”. . . “that is, everyone
who can rationally appreciate the situation agrees.” Moral norms
should be grounded in good reasons that cannot be rationally
rejected by anyone involved (Mead, 1934). Kohlberg had a similar
perspective with his idea of moral development as ideal role
taking, and his notion of “moral musical chairs” consisting of
taking all the perspectives involved in a moral dilemma. But
this was overshadowed by Kohlberg’s unfortunate adoption of a
problematic view of Piaget’s stages (Carpendale, 2000). Habermas
(1983/1990) argued that aspects of this process of considering
all relevant points of view are embedded in the structure of
conversation and argumentation, and thus engaging in these
activities presupposes morality (see also Forst, 2005).
Piaget’s (1932/1965) account focuses on interaction among
school aged children, but even to get to this point in development
we suggest that it is already possible to see the beginning of
morality in the preconditions for interaction and communication
(Winch, 1972). Infants’ biological embodiment, such as being
helpless at birth and thus requiring care, structures the social and
emotional system in which they develop (Portmann, 1944/1990;
Carpendale and Lewis, 2021). Here we focus on the moral aspects
of the human developmental system. The roots of morality are
already emerging in the way in which caregivers respond to their
infants as persons. Even in the first few months of life mothers
find it difficult to treat their babies as objects when researchers
ask them to hold a “still face” rather than respond normally to
their young infants. If infants are accustomed to the enjoyable
interaction, they often try to elicit it by smiling if it is missing.
Although caregivers’ difficulty in not responding to their babies
is considered an obstacle in conducting research using the “still
face” paradigm, from our perspective it is a finding revealing
the way caregivers respond to their infants as persons (Mcquaid
et al., 2009). This reciprocal responding to each other may be a
source of the expectation for turn taking in interaction. Treating
others as someone not something is already present in this early
interaction. A foundational component for human declarative
communication is the development of children’s enjoyment in
participating in interaction as a goal in itself. This development
can be charted from enjoying attention to self, then to what the
self does, and to the activity of showing and giving objects, as
well as also to interest and enjoyment in participating in adults’
activities (Bates et al., 1975; Rheingold, 1982; Reddy, 2003).
We begin from children’s activity within a developmental
system, thus our approach could be mistaken for behaviorism.
But our goal is to explain psychological development as arising
from interaction and communication, rather than assume the
mind as presupposed and therefore not explained (e.g., Mead,
1934). Behaviorism is restricted to passive association and cannot
account for meaning. Thus, behaviorism is situated within the
Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview that we have criticized.
Instead, from an action-based process approach, infants learn
about the world through their experience within which they
come to anticipate outcomes of their actions. They perceive
the world in terms of potential for interaction (e.g., Chapman,
1999), and through this process the world becomes meaningful
to them. Instead of a passive association, any association is
due to the meaningful relationship the child forms. From
an action-based perspective, the child is not thought of as
learning a response to a stimulus. Instead, the child is “coming
to organize his activity in a particular way (which he can
extend to other contexts) and coordinating this activity with the
corresponding acts of the mother” (Clark, 1978, p. 240). The
child is not mechanistically and passively forming associations
between meaningless unrelated stimuli. Instead, she is active
with goals, needs and interests, as she learns about the potential
for action on the physical world. Infants’ interaction with the
world becomes more complex as they come to anticipate the
outcomes of their actions. When infants begin employing an
action as a means to attain a goal, we can say they are
acting with intention, typically beginning at about 8 months
of age (Piaget, 1936/1952). Toward the middle of their second
year, toddlers begin to coordinate action schemes implicitly or
mentally. This is the beginning of one form of mental activity in
which they can mentally anticipate the outcomes of their actions
(Piaget, 1936/1952).
Unintentional communication is present in interaction even
in infants’ early months of life because, for example, the crying of
a newborn infant has significance for caregivers. An important
transition is to intentional communication beginning toward
the end of the first year of life. This occurs as infants learn
the significance or meaning their actions have for others. They
come to anticipate social outcomes of stable social structures, or
routines, such as requests, responding to questions, or sharing
attention. These shared social routines form stable structures of
interaction with common expectations in which words can be
used (Carpendale and Lewis, 2021).
The links between communication and morality are complex
and bidirectional over development. Communication in the
human intentional sense and morality are both located within
and emerge from forms of interaction in which individuals
develop and experience themselves in relation to others (e.g.,
Carpendale, 2018). Communication from this perspective is
not a matter of transmitting meaning attached to symbols,
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words, or representations, as it is in the Cartesian-split-
mechanistic worldview. Rather, communication is situated in the
coordination of action and so it entails a view of selves in relations
to others, that is, morality. Communication and morality are two
sides to a coin, two ways of talking about human relations.
Language provides a way of talking about and reflecting
on as well as understanding human activity with mental
state terms. Beginning in their third year, children start to
learn words referring to mental states such as want, know,
forget and so on. These words refer to human activity
(Carpendale and Lewis, 2015). Through experiencing others’
reactions to themselves, children come to take themselves
as an object. That is, to take others’ perspective on their
self, and thus to become able to reflect on their self, and
now to have a self rather than just be a self (Mead, 1934).
Their psychological language can now be used to reflect
on their own experience as well as help in understanding
others’ experience. This is a developmental outcome of a
gradual process that begins in activity and interaction with
others (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009; Canfield, 2007; Racine and
Carpendale, 2008). This approach to the development of
children’s social understanding contrasts with the causal
psychological view that mental states underlie and cause outer
behavior, assumed in the Cartesian perspective underlying
much of the work on children’s theories of mind (see
Carpendale and Lewis, 2004, 2006, 2015, 2021; Racine
and Carpendale, 2008). Instead, mental states are logically
linked to such action and cannot be identified independently
(Racine and Carpendale, 2008).
The link between morality and communication can be seen
in the way that cooperation is a principle that underlies and
structures typical conversation because it is possible to derive
additional meaning from utterances in conversation based
on the assumption that others are cooperating in conveying
meaning (Grice, 1975). Furthermore, Grice viewed conversation
as a special case of human cooperative interaction in general.
Although it is possible to use language to deceive others, lying
is only possible because truth telling is the norm (Holiday, 1988).
Concern for others and their dignity is embedded in the
pragmatics of conversation and politeness (Brown and Levinson,
1987; Turnbull, 2003). The care and concern for others
that structures our interaction is also a foundation for the
development of moral obligation (Carpendale, 2018; Carpendale
and Lewis, 2020). Language is based on moral aspects of
interaction and enables further complexity in morality through
understanding and coordinating with others’ perspectives.
Some of the processes we have presupposed in moral
development are based on individuals giving reasons to others
and listening to others’ reasons. But in the casual world of natural
science how do we find room for reasons? Reasons have no
place in the lives of other animals, even social species. Why is
it that humans give reasons and expect reasons from others?
From the perspective we take, reasoning emerges within social
relations, within interpersonal obligations to others because they
are given to others (Kitchener, 2004): “Man is a rational being
because he is a social being” (Mead, 1934, p. 379). Giving reasons
to others and valuing others’ reasons and responding develops
within interpersonal relations of caring and obligation. In some
families, young children are given reasons even before they can
understand them, whereas in other families they may be told to
do things without reasons. Children must also learn when reasons
are expected from them, often to explain actions in the context of
social expectations. This requires understanding our actions in
relation to others and appreciating the effect of our actions on
others, which involves being able to take others’ perspectives on
the self. In Mead’s (1934, p. 138) words, “The importance of what
we term ‘communication’ lies in the fact that it provides a form of
behavior in which the organism or the individual may become an
object to himself.” This allows individuals to see their actions in
relations to others.
This link between communication and morality is further
explicated by Spaemann (2006, pp. 14–15):
“To speak of oneself in the third person is to step out of the
central position that all living things in nature occupy in relation
to their environments, and to see oneself with other people’s eyes
as something ‘out there’. For this one must adopt a point of view
from outside of one’s own organic center. Morality is possible only
with this capacity for self-objectification and self-relativization; only
on these terms, too, is speech possible. Speech differs from the cries
of living things in nature, in that it anticipates the standpoint of
the one who is to hear what is spoken. When someone says, ‘I am
in pain’, that statement is not merely a cry by other means. The
immediate expression of pain must be suppressed, in order to form
a communication about the pain as an event in the world and to
make that communication intelligible to another.”
This ability to take oneself as an object through appreciating
others’ attitudes toward the self makes it possible to consider
one’s own perspective and action in relation to others, and
this is required in order to coordinate perspectives and arrive
at moral solutions. This social process of seeing oneself in
others’ eyes may also be important in coming to value and
integrate the moral dimensions of oneself, that is, to develop one’s
moral self (Krettenauer, 2013). The approach to this problem
that is consistent with the process-relational framework we
endorse is to conceptualize development in this area as an
inter-personal social process that is based in lived interaction
and crosses multiple domains of development (Krettenauer,
2013). The relationships of mutual respect in which practical
morality emerges are also linked to a sense of self value
and confidence, as well as moral and intellectual development
(Wright, 1982b).
We have grappled with the task of explaining the development
of moral norms. But, given the extent of injustice and oppression
in the world, it could be argued that the development of morality
does not always, or even typically, occur, so why does it go
wrong? From our perspective, development occurs within a
system and thus many factors can vary resulting in different
outcomes. But the first step is to explain how morality is
even possible. Furthermore, we have to explain how it is that
we can recognize injustice when it occurs. In addition, one’s
conception of how things can go wrong depends on one’s view
of how they can go right. Thus, the first step is to explain how
morality is possible.
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Of course, not all relationships children experience are
cooperative. Children’s early relationships may necessarily tend
to be more constraining, and any relationship is some mixture
of constraint based on one-sided respect and inequality, and
cooperation based on mutual respect and equality (Piaget,
1932/1965). Children do sometimes constrain and bully others,
and, on the other hand, parents can be cooperative to varying
degrees. The process we have described can run off the rails in
various ways, and through this experience children learn about
the social consequences of their actions (e.g., Dahl et al., 2011).
There are factors in human interaction such as greed leading to
oppression and inequality, and language can be used to deceive
and oppress others. But there is also constant struggle against
such forces as individuals recognize oppression, inequality, and
lack of fairness. We are inclined to be convinced by Piaget’s
(1932/1965) hopeful stance that in spite of setbacks there is
still the potential for gradual progressivity in societal change
toward a more just world (Chapman, 1988). Based on Piaget’s
position, we argue that moral progress on a societal level is made
possible because, as part of the foundation of moral development,
caring for others means learning to care for and respect others’
perspectives and to treat these perspectives as equivalent to our
own. These are the constitutive rules that underlie engaging
in a moral process in which norms can be constructed and
changed based on negotiation and consensus within relationships
of mutual affection and mutual respect. This is a social process
which begins with caring for others in close relationships and
can then be extended to engaging with and respecting other
perspectives on a societal level. Such a process, originally rooted
in close interpersonal relationships, provides one means for
moral progress as more perspectives become coordinated at a
societal level (Mead, 1934; Carpendale and Lewis, 2020, 2021).
This progress could extend beyond the initial circle of close
relationships to include more perspectives within one’s culture
and beyond, and could also be extended to other species and the
broader biosphere4.
DISCUSSION
Humans inhabit webs of moral obligations and commitments.
We live with a sense of right and wrong, an understanding of what
ought to be done in a world of norms, a space of justification.
We have grappled with the issue of explaining the source of such
moral norms, and accounting for how the feeling of obligation
emerges in children’s lives as different from conformity to social
conventions. Two common approaches are that moral norms are
imposed on children by previous generations or that they are
innate. We have argued that by themselves these explanations are
incomplete and are attempts to explain away rather than explain
moral norms. Nativists reduce morality to being caused to act
4Our approach contrasts with the two steps in explaining moral obligation
proposed by Tomasello (2020): first, the level of interpersonal obligation, and a
second level of “objective” morality. He explains the second step as involving an
extension to the collective resulting through social pressure experienced from the
internalized “we.” In essence, this is conformity rather than morality. Although
conformity is a part of human life, we suggest that this is an incomplete account of
morality (Carpendale and Lewis, 2020).
due to biology and empiricists reduce morality to conformity
to socially imposed rules, so either, or a combination of the
two, rule out the person as actually making a choice. From our
perspective, both are no longer talking about morality, but are
instead referring either to something within the child compelling
her to act or to conformity to social rules. Although children do
grow up within cultures with moral norms imposed on them, this
does not explain the source of such norms and children must
still come to understand and perhaps challenge and change such
norms. A middle ground as a mixture of the two still does not
deal with morality.
The assumption that biological factors play a role in morality
must be further spelled out (Dahl et al., 2021) and this can be
done either from a gene-centered perspective or a developmental
systems approach. From the perspective we propose, morality
and the idea of justice emerges and does not pre-exist in either
societal beliefs nor in the biology of the individual. It develops
reliably given certain conditions, just as a whirlpool is a structure
that emerges in the flow of liquids given certain conditions,
although it does not pre-exist anywhere. The individual’s
biological heritage results in the conditions in which the idea
of justice can emerge. From this perspective, it is recognized
that knowledge cannot be innate in the sense that it is directly
the result of genes, but rather that there is a much more
complex developmental system in which ideas about morality can
develop (Piaget, 1932/1965; Carpendale, 2009; Carpendale et al.,
2013). Thus, a third option in understanding the development
of moral norms is the developmental systems approach within a
process-relational perspective according to which biological and
social factors do not simply pre-exist separately but are instead
abstracted from social and emotional developmental systems in
which they are intertwined and mutually create each other.
The way that the link between morality and social outcomes
is conceptualized depends on the worldview researchers adopt.
From the perspective we take, the goal is to trace a natural history
of the development of moral norms through the increasingly
complex forms of coordination emerging in dyads as children
construct social and moral skills through their interaction
with others. Morality concerns the coordination of action
with others, and it emerges within the social consequences
of children’s actions at the level of intersubjective engagement
with others who we respect and care for. Within cooperative
relationships among equals children work out what is fair at
a practical lived level. Norms are first implicit in interaction
and ways of treating others, and children gradually come to
consciously realize the principles that underlie their practical
interaction. This process of interpersonal coordination continues
in more complex ways with language as children became aware
of the implicit norms that structured their interaction, and
with the development of reasoning and justifications. From a
process-relational perspective, communication and morality are
interwoven. Morality emerges as an aspect of living with others. It
is not that care and morality had to evolve as something separate,
but rather caring about each other is what makes us human. It
structures the human developmental system, the human social
emotional cradle in which children develop (e.g., Carpendale and
Lewis, 2021). Morality and communication emerge out of human
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relations. From an action-based perspective we begin with social
activity, and the social consequences of children’s action form
the experience through which children develop morality. In a bi-
directional manner, the understanding children develop in this
process can then influence their subsequent thinking and action.
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